Portal Spraw Zagranicznych psz.pl

Portal Spraw Zagranicznych psz.pl

Serwis internetowy, z którego korzystasz, używa plików cookies. Są to pliki instalowane w urządzeniach końcowych osób korzystających z serwisu, w celu administrowania serwisem, poprawy jakości świadczonych usług w tym dostosowania treści serwisu do preferencji użytkownika, utrzymania sesji użytkownika oraz dla celów statystycznych i targetowania behawioralnego reklamy (dostosowania treści reklamy do Twoich indywidualnych potrzeb). Informujemy, że istnieje możliwość określenia przez użytkownika serwisu warunków przechowywania lub uzyskiwania dostępu do informacji zawartych w plikach cookies za pomocą ustawień przeglądarki lub konfiguracji usługi. Szczegółowe informacje na ten temat dostępne są u producenta przeglądarki, u dostawcy usługi dostępu do Internetu oraz w Polityce prywatności plików cookies

Back Jesteś tutaj: Home Strefa wiedzy Gospodarka Jaka przyszłość dla stabilności państw Śródziemnomorskiego Sąsiedztwa?

Jaka przyszłość dla stabilności państw Śródziemnomorskiego Sąsiedztwa?

17 październik 2011
Artykuł koncentruje się wokół próby dokonania analizy prognostycznej dla sukcesu EPS oraz związanej z nią UdŚ. W tym celu wymienione są główne, najważniejsze problemy typowe dla tego regionu, na który składają się państwa Afryki Północnej oraz Bliskiego Wschodu What future for the stability of the European Union’s Mediterranean Neighbourhood in the context of the Union for the Mediterranean and the European Neighbourhood Policy.


The article’s main objective is trying to forecast, what will be the future developments in the European  Union’s (EU) Southern neighbouring states politics and what leverage will the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and Action Plans  implementation have on shaping of their policies. Currently, especially in the Mediterranean basin, the ENP faces a lot of problems, connected with the tense situation created by the recent Israeli - Palestinian violence outbreaks, military intervention in Libya and the Yasmin revolutions, which have run through the region in 2011 and have still not yet ceased . But these are not the only problems in the Mediterranean, as the region is fraught with the social and economic problems. The article is thus a particular forecast attempt, being made at a time of revolutionary changes in the North African (NA) and Middle East (ME) states which together form the Southern Mediterranean EU neighbourhood, included in one ENP, in operation since 2004  and since 2008 grouped in the wider Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) .

    The article tries to foresee, how much leverage on the EU’s Mediterranean neighbours stability will the ENP have in the close future. It does this by deliberating if the EU has the means for the region stabilization - providing for the security and prosperity for the Southern Mediterranean states. This is done by showing which problems are persistent in the MENA region, with a particular emphasis on the Arab-Israeli conflict and stating that its solution is necessary for any permanent stabilization attempts in the region. Also, the importance of the stability promotion through the economic means is noticed here. The projects development in the region under the auspices of the recently established Union for the Mediterranean is seen as a crucial factor for these countries’ development and stabilization. It is foresaw here, that the UfM is an important upgrade of the EuroMed relations and will play a crucial role in the region as a platform for the EU’s multilateral dialogue with its MENA (Middle East and North Africa) neighbours.

    When it comes to the future of stability in the Mediterranean forecasts, the ENP seems to be lacking incentives there, probably even more than in the Eastern ENP area, where the countries, lying geographically in Europe, might expect at least vague EU memebership prospects. Fifteen years after the launch of the Barcelona Process it has become clear that the Euro-Med co-operation develops slowly, and the Barcelona Declaration implementation, as well as the APs, is often interrupted and overwhelmingly bumpy. It is evident that for the MENA countries the possibility of future EU accession is excluded, as these are not geographically, nor mentally European countries. Perhaps however, if the countries develop economically and their political systems one day become similar to the European, it can be supposed, that they will also ask for the accession perspective. This has already had a precedence in the Moroccan case, when the country applied for the possibility to join the EU and it is sure that this country would be even more ENP – willing, if the policy offered the EU membership. While it is not the case, the Mediterranean countries are not too enthusiastic about the policy.  

    The recent establishment of the Union for the Mediterranean within the ENP made a ground for the revival of the debate aiming at answering to what end are the Euro-Med relations leading. The UfM, a political upgrade and continuation of the Barcelona Process (partnership with the Europe’s Mediterranean neighbours started in 1995 with the Barcelona conference) and the ENP is an interesting endeavour in the history of the Mediterranean relations. It came in time and is similar in character to the Eastern Partnership, as it is a regional multilateral forum of relations and partnership in the predominantly bilateral ENP framework. At the same time, questions are posed if it has the means to provide for stability, security and a democratic change in the region’s future. The EMP (Euro – Mediterranean Partnership) as unique framework for Mediterranean partners did not get a chance to fully display its potential. Now people will evaluate the performances of different countries in the new framework. Achievers will be recognized in the UfM and non-achievers will have to increasingly explain themselves abroad and at home . Moreover, increased challenges, such as the urgent necessity to solve the Arab – Israeli conflict, and the Palestinian – Israeli one in particular, can be the source of further development.

    The future of the EU’s stability promotion within the ENP will depend largely upon the internal situation of the MENA countries. As it is known, spreading democracy and human rights is one of the diplomatic means by which the EU wants to stabilize its southern neighbourhood. Achieving democratic standards in MENA would, according to the EU, contribute to the achievement of peace and stability in the region. The EU believes that the democratic states do not make wars with each others. Nonetheless, so far only Israel is considered a democratic state in MENA, with well functioning market economy . The other  MENA countries’ political systems have so far been overwhelmingly authoritarian regimes, where people enjoyed few political freedoms and where Muslim mentality blended secular and religious rule (with the exception of Israel), and where economic situation rests unstable. Only the recent Yasmin revolution and social uprisings in the name of liberalization of the Arab countries’ policies, run by the stiffed hardliners, much too many years on their ruler’s posts, might also bring it the power of general liberalization and lessening the typical leverage of the Muslim’s law on their societies.

 It is also a matter of cultural security, that the Arab countries are feeling endangered by the Western or European intervention, even in form of co-operation. Even the moderate and educated Muslims argue that the reforms have to be introduced gradually and slowly, so that they would be followed by acceptation and changes in the mentality. What is more, after the Western interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Arabs and Muslims have become even more unwilling to co-operate with the Europeans and the Americans. Also, by the Western-like reforms, they feel culturally endangered .  It is thus a challenge for the EU to promote stability in the Mediterranean region through the democratization and law approximation. It can be stated, moreover, that the democratic reforms would not be going smoothly or even be possible  without the Yasmin Revolution which swipped off some of the hardline leaders in the region. The 2011 developments  in the region created a completely new situation for the EU’s relations with its MENA neighbours and it is now a particularly critical moment for the  EU policy makers to use it as a window of opportunity for introducing the reforms that waited in a queue since long.

Certainly the early agreement of the ENP Action Plans with Morocco, Jordan, Tunisia, Israel, and the Palestinian Authority indicates, in principle, the willingness of these countries to make substantial progress in adopting the Union’s values and approximating the EU legislation. Thus, Tunisia has committed itself to important reforms concerning human rights, while, for Israel, the ‘everything but institutions’, or the ‘silver carrot’ of the ENP has considerable advantages that can be realized only following satisfactory progress in the Peace Process .

It is clear that the Med partners responses to reforms proposals have been, and will continue to be, very uneven. A few of them actually co-own some reforms, while most of them only do so to a limited extend or not at all. This will result in a very fragmented ring of Mediterranean well-governed countries, which at the end of the day may not be favourable to EU security concerns . However, what the EU can do and will be doing is to promote stability by the means of combating poverty and promotion of social and economic development. The most recent economic crisis necessitates more focus on issues of economic and social development in the Mediterranean  . Thus, in the nearest future it will be of crucial importance to, apart from solving the Palestinian – Israeli conflict, promote stability through the economic means. It will require improving the effectiveness of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) resources management, for which the UfM has the potential. Also, the EuroMed project planning and management shall use the European Investment Bank (EIB) lending, of which €12.4 billion for ENPI countries (2007-13), will largely go to the Mediterranean: €8.7 billion . Typically, with the economic development will come increased will for political co-operation.

    Together with the UfM creation, came the new environment needed for the multilateral co-operation in the MENA region and this way overcoming the bilateral characteristics of the ENP. Nowadays the EU is on a way to strengthen ties of effective multilateralism in the Mediterranean region through the international co-operation, without giving up the long-term perspective of community building in the region. This would focus on the achievement of confidence building and conflict resolution and address the major conflict of the region, the Arab – Israeli conflict. There is a need for more active EU involvement in supporting President Obama’s initiatives in the Middle East peace process and to step up mechanisms of international dialogue in the Mediterranean. It will be now necessary for the EU to combine effective multilateralism with effective regionalism  in its stability promotion. Working towards developing common interest, such as the establishment of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in the MENA region or the creation of an effective system of intervention may be feasible goals that will also serve the overall EU aim of achieving regional cohesion and stability.

    The Euro – Mediterranean co-operation on the security and stability have already started developing and will be continuing in the nearest future around three main areas, that is enhancing political reforms, co-operation in matters of foreign and security policy, and implementing a common space of Justice, Security and Freedom (JSF) . Reforms and security play a prominent role in the ENP. It is expected that in the future the MENA countries will be contributing to the CSDP missions. So far this has been the case with Morocco, which took part in the EU’s Althea military operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in 2008 co-operated in a crisis management exercise . The UfM is meant to serve to these ends as a new multilateral dialogue platform. It is expected that the link to stability in the UfM will be ensured by the implementation of its large-scale projects. From the UfM point of view, the success it anticipates in implementing the big regional projects will provide for economic development, which is seen as a pre-condition for creating a common ground for the political and security co-operation . It is dubious, however, if only providing for the economic development will espouse stabilization. These two processes should therefore be developed simultaneously within the ENP and the UfM. The UfM will be moreover working for the building of the regional dimension, which was lost in the ENP due to only signing the bilateral APs.

The ENP is an inherently bilateral policy, inevitably bound to generate, sooner or later, fragmentation in the region. Even though the APs foresee the implementation of regional dimensions with respect to various objectives retained by partners, the regional dimensions there are on the sidelines. Furthermore, the Southern partners do not attach any serious priority to them. For some of the MENA countries the APs are seen as dictations. The lacking of the regional dimension of the ENP is bound to create a fragmented ring of countries, some of them well governed and stable and others less so. In strategic terms this fragmentation is definitely not an asset. In this perspective, only the development of the UfM, thanks to its multilateral political dialogue and region-wide economic projects can provide the dynamic regional dimension that the Euro-Med relations are currently sorely lacking. The UfM is expected to play a parallel role to the EaP in the EENP region. If the UfM turns out to be successful, it will provide the necessary regional background to the bilateral web of the ENP Action Plans. There are however objectives to be fulfilled, such as the completion of the
Euro - Mediterranean Free Trade Agreement (MEFTA). The task of developing an intermediate regional dimension remains essential to the implementation of the security strategy .

It is apparent that future of the ENP in the Mediterranean region will depend on three main factors: 1) relations between Israel and its Arab neighbours and thus on the finishing of the Arab-Israeli conflict; 2) directions of the development of the CFSP; 3) general situation and condition of the MENA countries , with particular attention paid to the political developments resulting from the Yasmin Revolution.
The situation in the Middle East, especially concerning the Arab-Palestinian conflict is extremely complicated. It was already in 2003, when the ‘Road Maps’ for the solution of the Arab-Isreali conflict were issued by the Middle East Quartet (the United States, the United Nations, EU, Russia). The plan which assumed ending the conflict in three subsequent phases till 2005, was not realized however and finished by a failure. It is also important to note that the Arab countries are not willing to co-operate with Israel, neither in the EMP or ENP framework. Especially Syria and Lebanon have been giving the proofs of it by boycotting of the Euro-Med summits . As long as mutual Israeli-Palestinian attacks not cease, the ENP will not be successful.

Concerning the solution of the Palestinian – Israeli conflict, it is high time for the EU to get to work, even if it stands in the shadow of the US policy there. It is the right moment now to undertake enforced diplomatic efforts to solve the Palestinian-Israeli dispute. The EU should support the B. Obama’s Middle East initiative, and in its pursuit of effective multilateralism, it needs to actively contribute by acting in these areas where it is more difficult for the US to take the lead . The repercussions of the last Gaza war are still fresh, Israeli Prime Minister B. Netanyahu says, that the country will continue to build settlements in Jerusalem , and Iran continues to call for wiping Israel off the world’s map . Thus, if the EU fails to act today, if the Israeli-Palestinian peace based on the two-state solution - which is universally accepted - will not be implemented now, further procrastination may cause the present window of opportunity vanish entirely. Moreover, the EU should cease to marginalize Hamas, which is in the hold of the Gaza Strip, and stop perceiving it as a terrorist organization. Currently no peace accord can be signed without engaging Hamas.

Diplomatic efforts aimed at bringing Israel and Palestinians back to the negotiating table are not sufficient. They need to be accompanied by swift progression to implementation, with international monitoring, training and support. Any future diplomatic initiative aimed at resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict needs to take into account the changes in the political and social environment that have occurred since the collapse of the Oslo process in 2000. The deployment of a robust international peacekeeping force in the West Bank and Gaza is increasingly considered a key part of creating a maintaining momentum towards realizing positive change on the ground. It was already envisaged in the Road Maps of 2003, but so far has not been implemented. An international peacekeeping force would work in partnership with the Palestinian Authority to assist in the rebuilding of its governance capacities. It would serve as a bridge until trust is rebuilt between Israel and the Palestinians and would transform the broader conflict environment. The intervention should at the same time assist Israel in meeting many of the security challenges it currently faces, facilitate Israeli - Palestinian security cooperation and monitor Palestinians’ compliance on their commitments to combat terrorist organizations against Israel. An enhanced international security presence in the West Bank and on the Gaza border would afford the international community not only a greater stake in promoting stability in the region but also a commitment to, and direct responsibility in enhancing the security environment for both Israel and the Palestinians .

Clearly, the EU has a stake in the current polarization of Fatah and Hamas. Its ‘West Bank first’ approach has contributed to the diminishing chance for engaging with a coherent Palestinian negotiating partner capable of implementing diplomatic progress . Any future EU’s stability promotion steps should thus engage Hamas into security and stability talks. The EU, as well as NATO, has an important role to play in this respect. Security guarantees offered by the EU as part of any future peace agreement should comprise a qualitative upgrade in security co-operation and bilateral ties. Working towards changing the Arab world attitude will be of invaluable importance here. The Arabs need to show that they accept Israel as a legitimate part of the region and take concrete measures towards normalizing relations. An international peacekeeping mission will not end the conflict. But it will allow for the gradual rebuilding of trust between Israel and the Palestinians, the reconstruction and effective managing of the Palestinian governing institutions, the orderly management of the Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank, and attending to the myriad security and political challenges involved in bringing about a peaceful resolution to this conflict .

If the Arab-Israeli conflict will be finished in the perspective of the nearest years, or more, the perspectives for the development of the ENP in the Mediterranean region have to be seen also through the prism of the US politics in the Middle East. The country has always been an important actor in the region, more important than the EU and it has its own economic interests there. This is due to the region’s oil wealth, as well as to the potential of being an enormous exports market for the US. It is true, that Washington is concentrated upon the political means of putting an end to the conflict, but it cannot be excluded, that after this goal fulfillment, the US will want more from the Middle East in terms of economic co-operation . This poses another challenge for future EU’s diplomacy. Therefore the EU should be careful not to neglect the effective functioning of its diplomacy in the Mediterranean region, so as to be able to face the concurrence of the US.

Another question for the future of the ENP stability promotion in the MENA region is the possibility of Turkey’s future EU membership. So far Turkey has managed to start the accession negotiations with the EU. It is also a member of the UfM. It is difficult to provide for a prognosis, when Turkey will become the EU member. However, it seems most probable, that Turkey’s accession would help the Euro-Med relations. Turkey would be acting for the deepening of co-operation with countries geographically and culturally close to it. Currently it is nonetheless still a rather long-time perspective .
As it was mentioned, the future condition of the MENA partners will play an important role and shape the Euro-Med relations as well as determine the successfulness of the ENP as a stability promotion policy. The Mediterranean partners are struggling with hardly solvable social and political problems. Apart from the Arab-Israeli conflict, there are other ones to solve, such as the Western Sahara conflict. Moreover, these underdeveloped countries, struggling with large emigration, radicalization and islamisation of their societies and the 2011 revolutions evidently need international help. Only good management of and raising the amount of the financial resources endowed in the ENP will deliver in the nearest future some degree of stabilization in the region. At the same time, clearly, there is no economic development, or it is to a much extent stalled, as long as the countries’ political systems do not respect the rule of law and civil liberties principles. Therefore, apart from using the economic means of stability promotion more effectively, the EU will need to engage more proactively into the political problems of the MENA countries. The diplomatic means of stability promotion need to be extended if the EU wants to develop the area of Freedom, Security and Justice in the Mediterranean region.

The engagement of the MENA partners in the EU CFSP, as well as in the FSJ area building can pave the way for the beginning of a new era of political co-operation tomorrow. This development will be an important building block in its strategy of effective multilateralism. It will contribute to improving the inter-state development in which Euro-Med relations are currently unfolding and making such relations more cooperative, secure and peaceful. The Euro-Med co-operation in the area of CSDP and FSJ area will enable the EU to respond to calls for contributing to manage or solve conflicts in the region. In this context the EU has already some experiences which can set a hopeful precedent for the future .


To conclude, in the future, similarly as in the Eastern ENP area, managing the incentives on offer will be a key aspect of the stability promotion within the ENP. If the EU succeeds in delivering incentives of interest to its neighbours, it will be able to combine supporting transition of the MENA states and to approach the strategic vision that the EU has of its neighbourhood. The ENP was designed as a strategy to foster the creation of a ring of friends in the Southern neighbourhood. Currently, this group of countries has highly differentiated relations with the EU and is weakly connected one to another by the horizontal links. Effective multilateralism, in contrast, may become more significant in a context of multiplied efforts at co-operation and stability promotion through international relations channels. These alteration are reflected in the political upgrade of the ENP in the Mediterranean neighbourhood area – the UfM.

In the nearest future a couple of factors will be crucial for the development of the Euro-Med relations and stability promotion within the ENP. Namely, solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, effective diplomacy leading to the stabilization of turbulences caused by the Yasmin Revolution and using it as a window of opportunity for greater co-operation, involvement of these countries in co-operation in the field of CFSP and FSJ, political and economic transition of the MENA countries, combating the poverty and social unrest in the region, leading to the conclusion of the MEFTA, providing for the rule of law, respect for human rights and civil liberties. All these issues make up a complex framework of problems that stand ahead of the ENP if it is to deliver for the stability promotion. Currently the creation of the UfM, the urgent need for a breakthrough in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the Yasmin Revolution all create a window of opportunity for the regional stabilization. However, if the Union fails to act today, it will have very negative consequences for the stability promotion within the ENP in the Mediterranean.

The ENP has not been able to resolve the problems of threats, challenges and conflicts persistent in the region. For the countries indulged in internal social problems and conflicts, following the EU dictations is often not a priority. Today, the MENA space is even more unstable than it was in 1995, when the EMP was launched. It leads to an overall negative evaluation of the stability promotion within the ENP in the Mediterranean area. Proper approach to the MENA countries and, above all, solving the Israeli - Palestinian conflict is more important for the  stability promotion than the EU promises under the EMP, the ENP,  the ENP+  or the UfM. Thus, it is high time for Brussels to engage vigorously into the Palestinan - Israeli case and in the other problems of the region, if the ENP and its upgrade for the Southern neighbours – the UfM  -  is to bring any visible results.

Communication from the Commission:‘European Neighbourhood Policy. Strategy Paper’, Brussels 12.05.2004, COM (2004) 373 final.
Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean, Paris, 13 July 2008, http://www.eu2008.fr/PFUE/lang/en/accueil/PFUE-07_2008/PFUE-13.07.2008/declaration_commune_du_sommet_de_paris_pour_la_mediterranee.html, accessed on 28.09.2011.

Ch. Bretherton, J. Vogler (eds.), ‘The EU as a Global Actor’, London Routledge 2006.
J. Zając, ‘Partnerstwo Eurośródziemnomorskie’, Warszawa 2005.
A. Ziętek , ‘ Adaptacja wartości europejskich w państwach Islamu’, Lublin 2004.

Main articles:
R. Aliboni, A. Saaf, ‘Human security: a new perspective for Euro-Mediterranean cooperation’, The EU Institute for Security Studies, 10 Papers for Barcelona 2010, September 2009.
M. Asseburg, P. Salem, ‘No Euro-Mediterranean community without peace’, The EU Institute for Security Studies,10 Papers for Barcelona 2010, September 2009.
C. Goerzig, ‘Engaging Hamas: rethinking the Quartet principles’, ISS Opinion, March 2010.
A. Marchetti, ‘Consolidation in Times of Crisis? The European Neighbourhood Policy as chance for neighbours?’, European Political Economy Review, No. 7 (Summer 2007).
J. Peters, ‘Beyond the impasse. International intervention and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process’, Chatham House, Briefing Paper, Middle East and North Africa Programme, February 2010.

Internet sources:
‘Iran demands US troop withdrawal’, The Islamic World webpage, http://www.islamic-world.net/index.php?subaction=showfull&id=1271690827&archive=&start_from=&ucat=2,5&, 19.04.2010, accessed on 27.05.2010.
‘Israeli PM says Jerusalem policy will not change’, BBC UK online, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8588444.stm, 26.03.2010, accessed on 28.09.2011.


    Artykuł “Jaka przyszłość dla stabilności państw Śródziemnomorskiego Sąsiedztwa w kontekście Unii dla Śródziemnomorza oraz Europejskiej Polityki Sąsiedztwa” jest próbą dokonania prognozy polityki Unii Europejskiej w basenie Morza Śródziemnego.

    W roku 1995 zainteresowanie UE regionem Morza Śródziemnomorskiego znalazło wyraz w ustanowieniu tzw. Procesu Barcelońskiego, by ewoluować następnie we włączenie tych państw w obszar Europejskiej Polityki Sąsiedztwa (EPS) w 2004 r., oraz w ustanowienie na konferencji w Paryżu w 2008 r. Unii dla Śródziemnomorza (UdŚ).

    Artykuł koncentruje się wokół próby dokonania analizy prognostycznej dla sukcesu EPS oraz związanej z nią UdŚ. W tym celu wymienione są główne, najważniejsze problemy typowe dla tego regionu, na który składają się państwa Afryki Północnej oraz Bliskiego Wschodu. Są to między innymi problemy społeczne, takie jak powszechne ubóstwo, emigracje, niedorozwój ekonomiczny, radykalizacja i islamizacja społeczeństw, nierozwiązane od lat konflikty, z Palestyńsko – Izraelskim na czele oraz toczące się przez region w 2011 roku rewolucje – ujęte pod jedną nazwą „Jaśminowa Rewolucja” i które doprowadziły już, w przypadku niektórych państw (Tunezja, Egipt), do odejścia od władzy wieloletnich, autorytarnych władców.

    W takim właśnie otoczeniu międzynarodowym działa EPS oraz UdŚ. Artykuł wskazuje na podstawowe braki i niedociągnięcia polityk UE w obszarze Afryki Północnej i Bliskiego Wschodu. Wymienione są tutaj między innymi Plany Działań (ang. Action Plans), które przypominają spis świątecznych życzeń a nie doprowadzają do znacznej poprawy w regionie, czy też niedostateczne finansowanie programów i projektów, jak też widoczna słabość działania Europejskiej dyplomacji w kontekście poprawy stosunków na Bliskim Wschodzie i dojścia do zakończenia konfliktu Palestyńsko – Izraelskiego.

    Artykuł wskazuje także na podstawowe założenia i cele EPS w basenie Morza Śródziemnego – stworzenie Euro – Śródziemnomorskiej Strefy Wolnego Handlu w dziedzinie ekonomicznej stabilizacji, oraz doprowadzenie do zakończenia konfliktów, liberalizacji  i większego respektowania podstawowych praw człowieka w państwach muzułmańskiego Południa oraz doprowadzenie do powstania wspólnej z UE Strefy Wolności, Bezpieczeństwa i Sprawiedliwości w regionie. Na chwilę obecną jednak realizacja tych wszystkich celów wydaje się bardzo trudna i odległa, przede wszystkim ze względu na dużą ilość problemów trapiących ten region świata oraz niedociągnięcia polityki Europejskiej, która zdaje się działać niedostatecznie aktywnie. Do ogólnej niezbyt pozytywnej oceny EPS w regionie Morza Śródziemnego dochodzą względy mniej zależne od UE, a wynikające z nieufności kulturowej państw Arabskich, różnic mentalnych. UE ciągle pozostaje także w cieniu polityki Stanów Zjednoczonych na Bliskim Wschodzie, związanej z ich wpływami i interesami ekonomicznymi.

    Artykuł kończy się konkluzjami, z których wynika, że w przyszłości kluczowym priorytetem dla polityki UE w ramach EPS oraz UdŚ będzie maksymalne wykorzystanie Unijnej dyplomacji i środków finansowych w celu pomocy państwom basenu Morza Śródziemnego w ich zmaganiach z problemami trapiącymi region oraz wyszukiwanie  i zarządzanie bodźcami motywującymi państwa Afryki Północnej i Bliskiego Wschodu do współpracy w UE, jeśli Unia dla Śródziemnomorza i stojąca za nią Europejska Polityka Sąsiedztwa ma przynieść jakiekolwiek widoczne rezultaty stabilizujące region.

Małgorzata Anna Pitura